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THE CHOQUET INTEGRAL WITH RESPECT TO FUZZY
MEASURES AND APPLICATIONS
ANNA RITA SAMBUCINI
Abstract. Fuzzy measures and Choquet asymmetric integral are consid-
ered here. As an application to economics some Core-Walras results are
given.
Introduction
Fuzzy measures are used in economics, probability, theory of control and have
been investigated by many authors [13, 16, 20, 23, 28–30, 41, 42, 44–46]. The aim
of the present paper is to search equilibria for pure exchange economies in fi-
nite dimensional commodity spaces, but with a more general structure for the
set of agents X . After the framework proposed by Aumann, to represent a
perfect competition assuming that the space of agents is a non-atomic measure
space, several extensions have appeared in the literature, see for example [3,27].
Some authors have considered finitely additive models, particularly in the coali-
tional sense ( [3–9,24,49]). More recently finitely additive settings are examined
in [37–40] and finitely additive economies with infinite dimensional commodity
space have been investigated from the individualistic point of view ( [1,2,35,36]).
Here the set of agents X is equipped with a fuzzy measure µ representing the
economic weight of the coalitions in the market, to compensate in some way the
loss of additivity some further conditions are assumed. Almost simple economies
are considered; this assumption is inspired by the models proposed in [2,5,25,35].
More precisely the whole population X can be decomposed into finitely many
coalitions, and the agents within the same coalition have both the same initial
endowment and the same criteria of preference.
In order to do this the Choquet integral is considered since it permits to inte-
grate a function with respect to a non-additive measure. Moreover the Choquet
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integral has been applied successfully in decision making, in artificial intelligence
and economics, see for example [10,22,26,29,32,34,41–43,48], and it can be ap-
plied also in vector lattices ( [12–15]).
The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 the properties of the
monotone integral are recalled and new results on it are given while in Section
3 the main economic concepts to a fuzzy model are readapted and competitive
equilibria are compared with the core of the economy: competitive equilibria
will belong to the core, for the converse it is proven that some particular allo-
cations in the core are in fact competitive equilibria. A particular model where
the initial endowment turns out to be an equilibrium is also provided.
Finally some particular cases are investigated, in which preferences are rep-
resented with concave, increasing functions: characterizations of the core are
given, and in some situations perfect equivalence Core-Walras is obtained.
1. Preliminaries and definitions
Let (X,A) be a measurable space, where A is a σ-algebra.
Definition 1.1. (Murofushi and Sugeno [42]) A fuzzy measure on a measurable
space (X,A) is a set function µ : A → R0+ with the properties: µ(∅) = 0;
µ(X) < +∞; if A ⊂ B, then µ(A) ≤ µ(B) (monotonicity).
Moreover
• µ is subadditive if for every A,B ∈ A, there holds µ(A ∪ B) ≤ µ(A) +
µ(B),
• µ is a submodular, if for everyA,B ∈ A, there holds µ(A∪B)+µ(A∩B) ≤
µ(A) + µ(B). In the literature submodularity is called also concavity
(see [34]). Note that if µ is a submodular then µ is subadditive.
• µ is continuous from below if An ∈ A, An+1 ⊂ An for n ∈ N implies that
limn→∞ µ(An) = µ(∪nAn).
In classical measure theory it is well-known that if f, g are measurable with
f = g outside a set of zero µ-measure, then their integrals are equal. This is
not valid in general for fuzzy measures and for the Choquet integral, for an
example see [46]. So the following definitions of null sets and almost everywhere
are introduced. In any case if µ is a subadditive fuzzy measure then every
measurable set of µ-measure zero is a null set ( [42, Proposition 5.2]).
Definition 1.2. ( [42]) A setN ∈ A is a null set (or also µ-null set) if µ(A∪N) =
µ(A) for every A ∈ A . Clearly, every null setN has µ-measure zero (it suffices to
choose A = ∅). Moreover, it is easy to see that the family of all µ-null sets is an
ideal in A and coincides with the family of all sets N such that µ(A\N) = µ(A)
for all A ∈ A .
Definition 1.3. Almost everywhere concept is defined using null sets, that is
f = g µ-a.e. if there exists a null set N such that f(x) = g(x) for every x ∈ N c.
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Often the following condition will be assumed:
Assumption 1.4. the ideal of µ-zero sets is stable under countable unions,
namely for every sequence (Ak)k such that µ(Ak) = 0 for each k ∈ N, then also
µ(
⋃
k Ak) = 0 .
If µ is also subadditive this assumption means that a countable union of µ-null
sets is again µ-null. If µ is continuous from below, then a countable union of
null sets is also a null set, and this in turn implies the same property with µ-zero
sets. ( [42, Proposition 5.2 (4)]). Recent results in such subject and for universal
integrals are given in [33].
The following definition is recalled:
Definition 1.5. ( [17,18]) µ is semiconvex if for every E ∈ A there exists F ∈ A,
F ⊂ E such that µ(F ) = 1
2
µ(E) and µ(E \ F ) = 1
2
µ(E);
Again in [17], an example is given of a submodular and semiconvex fuzzy
measure which is not additive. This example also satisfies the condition that
the µ-zero sets form a σ-ideal. This example is reported and extended here, by
the sake of completeness.
Example 1.6. Let X = [0, 1]2, with the usual Borel σ-algebra B. For each
B ∈ B, define
µ(B) :=
∫ 1
0
γ(By)dy,
where By is the usual y-section of B (and is measurable for almost all y ∈ [0, 1]),
γ(A) :=
√
λ1(A) and λ1 is the Lebesgue measure in [0, 1]. In order to prove that
µ is a submodular, it is sufficient to show that γ has this property. Indeed, let
A,A′ be any two subsets of [0, 1]. The following inequalities will be proved:
γ(A ∪ A′) + γ(A ∩ A′) ≤ γ(A) + γ(A′).
To this aim, denote by a, b, c respectively the quantities λ1(A), λ1(A
′), λ1(A∩A′),
and observe that c ≤ a ∧ b. Then the previous inequality reduces to√
a+ b− c+√c ≤ √a+
√
b,
i.e.
a+ b− c+ c+ 2√c · √a+ b− c ≤ a+ b+ 2
√
ab.
So, it is enough to prove that
√
c·√a+ b − c ≤ √ab, or, equivalently, c(a+b−c) ≤
ab. Now, a simple analysis of the parabola y = x(a + b− x), for 0 ≤ x ≤ a ∧ b,
shows that its maximum value is achieved when x = a ∧ b: and in this case the
maximum value is precisely ab. This concludes the proof of submodularity.
Semiconvexity is an easy consequence of additivity of the Lebesgue measure:
indeed, for every Borel subset B ⊂ X the mapping y 7→ ∫ y
0
γ(Bt)dt is continuous
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and therefore achieves the value
1
2
µ(B) for a suitable element t0 ∈ [0, 1], hence
B′ := B ∩ ([0, 1]× [0, t0]) satisfies µ(B′) = 1
2
µ(B).
Finally, in order to prove that the set of µ-zero sets form a σ-ideal it is enough
to show that µ(B) = 0 ⇐⇒ λ2(B) = 0: indeed, if µ(B) = 0, then γ(By) = 0
λ1-a.e., and so λ1(By) = 0 λ1-a.e., which in turn implies that λ2(B) = 0.
Conversely, if λ2(B) = 0 then λ1(By) = 0 for almost all y ∈ [0, 1] and therefore
γ(By) = 0 λ1-a.e., whence µ(B) = 0.
In the same paper the following properties of semiconvex submeasures have
been established.
Lemma 1.7. ( [17, Lemma 2.1]) If µ : A → R0+ is a fuzzy, finite and semi-
convex submeasure, then for every A ∈ A there exists a family of subsets of A,
(At)t∈[0,1] ⊂ A such that
(1.7.i) A0 = Ø, A1 = A;
(1.7.ii) µ(At) = tµ(A);
(1.7.iii) for t < t′, there hold At ⊂ At′ and µ(At′ \At) = (t′ − t)µ(A).
In particular, for every A ∈ A, the range of µ restricted to A is [0, µ(A)].
Proposition 1.8. For every A,B ∈ A with A ⊂ B, for every t ∈]0, 1[, and once
At ∈ A has been chosen according to Lemma 1.7 there exists Bt ∈ A, Bt ⊂ B
with Bt ∩A = At and µ(Bt) = tµ(B).
Proof. By Lemma 1.7 there exist two families (As)s∈[0,1], ((B \A)s)s∈[0,1] with
the properties (1.7.i), (1.7.ii) and (1.7.iii). Choose At in the first family, and
consider the family
B = {At ∪ (B \A)s, s ∈ [0, 1]}.
Then, as in [17, Theorem 2.3], B is arcwise connected with respect to the pseu-
dometric on dµ : A × A → R defined by: dµ(E,F ) = µ(E∆F ). Moreover,
µ : (A, dµ)→ R is uniformly continuous since, for every pair A1, A2 ∈ A, it is:
µ(A1)− µ(A2) ≤ µ(A1 ∩A2) + µ(A1 \A2)− µ(A2) ≤ µ(A1∆A2)
and analogously for µ(A2) − µ(A1). Therefore µ(B) is the interval µ(B) =
[µ(At), µ(At ∪ (B \A))]. It only remains to prove that tµ(B) lies in this interval.
From µ(A) ≤ µ(B) it follows that µ(At) = tµ(A) ≤ tµ(B). It will be shown now
that tµ(B) ≤ µ(At ∪ (B \ A)). Observe that, by construction At ∪ (B \ A) =
B \ (A \At), and so, since by (1.7.iii), µ(A \At) = (1− t)µ(A),
µ(At ∪ (B \A)) = µ(B \ (A \At)) ≥ µ(B)− (1− t)µ(A) =
= tµ(B) + (1 − t)[µ(B)− µ(A)] ≥ tµ(B).
Hence there exists K ∈ B such that µ(K) = tµ(B).
Setting Bt = K we have Bt = At∪(B\A)s for suitable s, and so Bt∩A = At. 
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On this subject other results have been obtained in [11, 19].
2. The Choquet integral
Let (X,A, µ) be a subadditive fuzzy measure space. A function f : X → R+0
is said to be measurable if {x|f(x) > α} is measurable for every α > 0.
Definition 2.1. The Choquet integral of a measurable function f is defined by∫ ∗
X
fdµ :=
∫ ∞
0
µ(f > t)dt,
where the integral on the right-hand side is an ordinary one. The function
f ∈ L1C(µ) if and only if f is measurable and
∫ ∗
X
fdµ <∞.
In the case of a measurable function f with values in R, according to [23] the
asymmetric integral is defined as∫ ∗
X
fdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ(f > t)dt+
∫ 0
−∞
[µ(f > t)− µ(X)]dt. (2.1)
For every A ∈ A the conjugate of µ is defined by: µ(A) := µ(X)− µ(Ac).
The Choquet integral fulfils the following properties:
Proposition 2.2. ( [23, Proposition 5.1, Exercise 9.3 and Theorem 6.3])
(2.2.i)
∫ ∗
X
1Adµ = µ(A);
(2.2.ii)
∫ ∗
X
cfdµ = c
∫ ∗
X
fdµ for c ≥ 0;
(2.2.iii) if 0 ≤ f ≤ g µ-a.e. then
∫ ∗
X
fdµ ≤
∫ ∗
X
gdµ ( [23, Exercise 9.3(c)]);
(2.2.iv)
∫ ∗
X
(f + c)dµ =
∫ ∗
X
fdµ+ cµ(X) for every c ∈ R;
(2.2.v) if µ is a submodular and µ(f > −∞) = µ(g > −∞) = µ(X), then∫ ∗
X
(f + g)dµ ≤
∫ ∗
X
fdµ+
∫ ∗
X
gdµ; ( [23, Theorem 6.3])
(observe that if f, g are non negative the µ-essential inf-boundedness is
satisfied; moreover this assumption can be dropped if µ is continuous
from below.) Conversely, if∫ ∗
X
(f + g)dµ ≤
∫ ∗
X
fdµ+
∫ ∗
X
gdµ
holds for all measurable non negative mappings f, g, then µ turns out
to be submodular: it suffices to replace f and g with the functions 1A
and 1B for arbitrary measurable sets A,B.
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(2.2.vi)
∫ ∗
X
− fdµ = −
∫ ∗
X
fdµ.
Definition 2.3. Given a non negative function f ∈ L1C(µ) let µf be its indefinite
Choquet integral, that is
µf (E) =
∫ ∗
E
fdµ =
∫ ∗
X
1Efdµ. (2.2)
It is clear then that µf is a fuzzy measure too. Observe that for arbitrary f
the equality (2.2) fails to be true for the asymmetric integral: (see [23, Chapter
11]).
Proposition 2.4. Let f, g be two non negative functions in L1C(µ); then:
2.4.1) µf is a subadditive fuzzy measure;
2.4.2) if µ is also a submodular then µf is a submodular.
2.4.3) if the family of µ-zero sets is a σ-ideal then also µf has the same property.
Proof. 2.4.1) Clearly µf is obviously fuzzy. Moreover
µ({x ∈ A ∪B : f(x) > t}) ≤ µ({x ∈ A : f(x) > t}) + µ({x ∈ B : f(x) > t})
and the assertion follows from both (2.2) and the additivity of the
Lebesgue integral.
2.4.2) Analogously, for the submodular case we have:
µf (A ∪B) =
∫ ∗
A∪B
fdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∪B : f(x) > t})dt ≤
≤
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A : f(x) > t})dt+
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ B : f(x) > t})dt+
−
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩B : f(x) > t})dt;
hence µf (A ∪B) + µf (A ∩B) ≤ µf (A) + µf (B).
2.4.3) Now, assume that the µ-zero sets form a σ-ideal, and let (Bn)n be any
sequence of µf -zero sets. Let B the union of all the sets Bn. Then,
by properties of the Lebesgue integral, for each integer n there exists
a Borel subset Nn of the halfline [0,+∞[ with zero Lebesgue measure,
such that µ({f > t} ∩ Bn) = 0 for all t /∈ Nn. So, if N =
⋃
nNn, it is
λ(N) = 0 and µ({f > t} ∩ Bn) = 0 for all t /∈ N and every n. Since
the ideal of µ-zero sets is a σ-ideal then µ({f > t} ∩ B) = 0, for every
t /∈ N , and hence µf (B) = 0.

Observe that (2.4.1) continues to be true for the asymmetric integral of an
arbitrary f if µ is a submodular, while (2.4.2) fails to be true ( [23, Chapter
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11]).
The indefinite Choquet integral of non negative functions is absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to µ in a stronger form than [23, Chapter 11]: namely
Proposition 2.5. Let f : X → R+ be an integrable function. Then, for every
ε > 0 there exists δ(ε) > 0 such that for every E ∈ A with µ(E) < δ(ε) then
µf (E) < ε.
Proof. Since the Choquet integral of non negative scalar functions is an improper
integral then, for every ε > 0, there exists a ∈ R+ such that
∫∞
a
µ(x : f(x) >
t)dt ≤ ε
2
. So, for every E ∈ A, by (2.2) it is
µf (E) =
∫ ∗
E
fdµ =
∫ a
0
µ(x ∈ E : f(x) > t)dt+
∫ ∞
a
µ(x ∈ E : f(x) > t)dt ≤
≤ aµ(E) + ε
2
.
So it is enough to choose δ(ε) = ε/2a. 
On this subject see also [21]. The next proposition permits to obtain the
same results as in [23, Proposition 11.1] but with different hypotheses: in the
quoted proposition µ is asked to be monotone and continuos from below, here
the first condition will be strengthened while the second will be weakened.
Proposition 2.6. If µ is a subadditive fuzzy measure whose zero sets form a
σ-ideal and if f, g are two non-negative measurable functions with µf ≤ µg, then
f ≤ g µ-a.e.
Proof. Assume by contradiction µ(f > g) is positive. Since A = {f > g} =
∪k{f > g + 1/k} = ∪kAk, then there should exist m for which µ(Am) > 0
(otherwise, by the σ-ideal condition, µ(A) should be zero too). Then
µf (Am) ≥
∫ ∗
Am
(g +
1
m
)dµ = µg(Am) +
1
m
µ(Am) > µg(Am).

In measure theory it is well-known that if f, g are measurable then f = g
µ-a.e. (in the classical sense), if and only if their integrals are equal. This is not
valid for the Choquet integral unless we assume that the ideal of µ-zero sets is
stable under countable unions:
Corollary 2.7. If µ is a subadditive fuzzy measure whose zero sets form a σ-
ideal, f, g are two non negative and measurable functions and µf (E) = µg(E)
for every E ∈ A, then f = g in X µ-a.e.
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Proof. Since µf (E) ≤ µg(E) and µf (E) ≥ µg(E) for every E ∈ A the assertion
follows from Proposition 2.6. 
For simple functions, without subadditivity assumption on µ, one has:
Proposition 2.8. [23, Chap. 5, pag. 63] Let f : X → R0+ be defined by f(x) =∑r
i=1 xi1Ai(x), with Ai ∩ Aj = Ø if i 6= j. If xi > xi+1, i = 1, . . . , r − 1, then∫ ∗
X
fdµ =
r∑
i=1
(xi − xi+1)µ(Si) (2.3)
where Si = ∪j≤iAj and xr+1 = 0.
As a consequence of Proposition 2.8, a Jensen-type inequality for the Choquet
integral will be stated. This result is still valid without subadditivity assump-
tions. This inequality was already given by [32, 47, 50] under suitable assump-
tions, however here a more direct proof will be stated, relying essentially upon
Proposition 2.8. For further use, only the formulation for concave functions will
be given.
Theorem 2.9. (Jensen inequality) Let f : X → R0+ be any integrable function,
and assume that u : R0+ → R0+ is any concave continuous monotone mapping
such that u(f) is integrable too. Then it is
u(µ(X)−1µf (X)) ≥ µ(X)−1µu(f)(X).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that µ(X) = 1. As a first step, suppose
that f is simple, i.e. f(x) =
∑k
i=1 xi1Ai(x), assuming xi > xi+1 for all i =
1, ..., k − 1.
Then u(f(x)) =
∑k
i=1 u(xi)1Ai(x); since u is monotone it is u(xi) ≥ u(xi+1)
for all i. Then, using (2.3), one can write
µf (X) = xkµ(X) + (xk−1 − xk)µ(Sk−1) + . . .+ (x3 − x2)µ(A1 ∪ A2) +
+ (x2 − x1)µ(A1) + x1µ(A1) =
= xk
(
µ(X)− µ(Sk−1)
)
+ xk−1µ(Sk−1) + . . .+ (x3 − x2)µ(A1 ∪ A2) +
+ (x2 − x1)µ(A1) + x1µ(A1) =
= xk
(
µ(X)− µ(Sk−1)
)
+ xk−1
(
µ(Sk−1)− µ(Sk−2) + xk−2µ(Sk−2) + . . .
+ (x2 − x1)µ(A1) + x1µ(A1) =
= xk
(
µ(X)− µ(Sk−1)
)
+ xk−1
(
µ(Sk−1)− µ(Sk−2)
)
+ . . .+
+ x2
(
µ(A1 ∪ A2)− µ(A1)
)
+ x1µ(A1).
This formula shows that the integral of f is a convex combination of the elements
xk, xk−1, ..., x1, obtained with the positive coefficients
µ(X)− µ(Sk−1), µ(Sk−1)− µ(Sk−2), . . . , µ(A1 ∪ A2)− µ(A1), µ(A1),
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whose sum is µ(X) = 1. And clearly the same coefficients appear in the for-
mula giving µu(f)(X). So, by concavity of u it follows easily that u(µf (X)) ≥
µu(f)(X). and this proves the theorem for the case f simple.
If f is not simple, but bounded, then f can be uniformly approximated with a
sequence of simple functions fn (the usual Lebesgue ladder does the job). Then
u(f) is uniformly approximated by the sequence u(fn), since u is locally uni-
formly continuous. Then
u(
∫ ∗
X
fdµ) = lim
n
u(
∫ ∗
X
fndµ) ≥ lim
n
∫ ∗
X
u(fn)dµ =
∫ ∗
X
u(f)dµ.
Finally, suppose that f is unbounded. In this case, for each integer N define
fN := f ∧N , and observe that∫ ∗
X
fdµ = lim
N
∫ ∗
fNdµ.
Then
u(
∫ ∗
X
fNdµ) ≥
∫ ∗
X
u(fN)dµ =
∫ ∗
X
u(f) ∧ u(N)dµ.
The conclusion now follows observing that
lim
N
u(
∫ ∗
X
fNdµ) = u(
∫ ∗
X
fdµ) and that lim
N
∫ ∗
X
u(f) ∧ u(N)dµ =
∫ ∗
X
u(f)dµ.

The Jensen inequality given here holds (in the opposite sense) also when
concavity is replaced by convexity; its proof is perfectly similar to this.
2.1. The vector Choquet integral. In Rn let Rn+ be the positive orthant,
and (Rn+)
◦ be its interior. Also let ≤ be the usual order between numbers, and
≪ be the usual partial order between vectors in Rn, namely x≪y means that
xi ≤ yi for every i = 1, 2, · · · , n, while x≫ y means that xi > yi for every i.
Definition 2.10. Given a vector measurable function f = (f1, . . . fn) : X → Rn+
the monotone integral is considered componentwise, and the notation
∫ ∗
fdµ is
used for the vector ∫ ∗
fdµ =
(∫ ∗
f1dµ, . . . ,
∫ ∗
fndµ
)
.
Then f ∈ L1C(µ,Rn+) if each of its components is in L1C(µ).
Assumption 2.11. Suppose now that µ is a fuzzy measure which satisfies the
following condition:
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(H.0) there exists a partition {Ei, i = 1, . . . , r} ofX , such that for every A ∈ A
µ(A) =
r∑
i=1
µ(A ∩Ei).
Assumption (H.0) means that µ can be cut in a finitely additive way on {Ei, i =
1, . . . , r}, namely µ(A∩∪j≤kEj) =
∑k
j=1 µ(A∩Ej), for every A ∈ A, k ≤ r; in
fact
µ(A ∩ (∪j≤kEj)) =
r∑
i=1
µ(A ∩ (∪j≤kEj) ∩Ei) =
k∑
j=1
µ(A ∩ Ej).
Remark 2.12. Trivially, the measure µ defined in Example 1.6 satisfies assump-
tion (H.0) with n = 1, however it can be easily modified in order to admit an
arbitrary finite number of subsets of the type Ei: it will suffice to paste together
the squares Ei := [i, i+1[×[0, 1], each with a copy of the measure µ, and defining
additively the measure of all sets that are unions of measurable subsets of the
E′is.
From now on (H.0) will be assumed and denote by {Ei, i ≤ r} the finite
decomposition of X involved in it.
Proposition 2.13. If g : X → Rn+ is in L1C(µ,Rn+), then, for every A ∈ A,
2.13.1) µg(A) =
∑r
i=1 µg(A ∩ Ei).
2.13.2) In particular, if g is of the form g =
∑r
i=1 ci1Ei then, for every A ∈ A,
its Choquet integral is given by µg(A) =
∑r
i=1 ciµ(A ∩ Ei).
2.13.3 If µ is submodular and f : X → Rn+ is in L1C(µ,Rn+) then, for every
A,B ∈ A it is∫ ∗
X
(f1A + g1B)dµ ≪
∫ ∗
A
fdµ+
∫ ∗
B
gdµ.
Proof. Fix A ∈ A: then
µg(A) =
∫ ∗
A
gdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A : g(x) > t})dt =
=
∫ ∞
0
r∑
i=1
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ei : g(x) > t})dt =
=
r∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ei : g(x) > t})dt =
=
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
gdµ =
r∑
i=1
µg(A ∩ Ei).
The second part of the assertion is trivial. The last assertion follows directly
from (2.2.v) and equation (2.2). 
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So, assumption (H.0) makes the integral of simple functions on (Ei)i≤r ad-
ditive. Moreover
Proposition 2.14. If g : X → Rn+ is Choquet integrable then, for every p ∈ Rn+,
2.14.a) µp·g(X) =
∑r
i=1 µp·g(Ei),
2.14.b) moreover, if g is constant on each Ei (namely g(x) = ci on Ei) then
µp·g(X) =
r∑
i=1
p · µg(Ei) = p · µg(X).
Proof. 2.14.a) is a direct consequence of 2.13.1), just replacing the vector func-
tion g with the scalar map p · g. The last statement follows readily from the fact
that on each Ei the function p · g = p · ci is constant and so, by linearity of p
µp·g(X) =
∫ ∗
X
p · gdµ =
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
Ei
p · gdµ =
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
Ei
p · cidµ =
r∑
i=1
p · ciµ(Ei) =
= p ·
r∑
i=1
ciµ(Ei) = p ·
∫ ∗
X
gdµ = p · µg(X).

The following lemma is a consequence ot the previous two propositions.
Lemma 2.15. Let f, g be two scalar integrable non-negative mappings, and
assume that and f > g µ − a.e. on a set S with µ(S) > 0. If g is constant on
each Ei, then µf (S) > µg(S).
Proof. Let g :=
∑r
i=1 ci1Ei. Thanks to Propositions 2.13 and 2.14, it is∫ ∗
S
fdµ =
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
S∩Ei
fdµ,
and ∫ ∗
S
gdµ =
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
S∩Ei
gdµ =
r∑
i=1
ciµ(S ∩ Ei).
Now, for each i by monotonicity it follows that∫ ∗
S∩Ei
fdµ ≥ ciµ(S ∩ Ei),
so, it will suffice to find an index i such that the strict inequality holds. Since
µ(S) > 0, there exists at least an index i for which µ(S ∩ Ei) > 0: this is the
requested index, in fact in the set S ∩ Ei the function f is strictly larger than
the constant ci. From the basic property (2.2.iv) it is∫ ∗
S∩Ei
(f − ci)dµ =
∫ ∗
S∩Ei
fdµ− ciµ(Ei ∩ S).
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So, it is enough to prove that the strictly positive function f − ci (in the set
Ei∩S) has strictly positive integral. But now, thanks to the properties of µ-zero
sets, there exists an integer k such that the set Ak := {a ∈ S ∩Ei : f − ci > 1
k
}
has positive measure, otherwise µ(Ei ∩ S) = 0: then∫ ∗
S∩Ei
(f − ci)dµ ≥
∫ ∗
Ak
(f − ci)dµ ≥ d1
k
µ(Ak) > 0
and this concludes the proof. 
3. Walrasian equilibria and core of an economy
The following economic model is introduced:
Assumption 3.1. A pure exchange economy is a 4-tuple
E = {(X,A, µ); Rn+; e; {≻a}a∈X}, where:
(E1) (Perfect competition) the space of agents is a triple (X,A, µ), where
(X,A) is a measurable space and µ is a fuzzy semiconvex submodular
such that the ideal of µ-zero sets is stable under countable unions and
satisfying (H.0). Each set Ei denotes the set of agents of type i.
(E2) The finite dimensional space Rn is the commodity space, its positive
cone Rn+ represents the consumption set of each agent.
(E3) Each consumer a ∈ Ei is characterized by its initial endowment e(a) =
ei. Since the initial endowment density e : X → (Rn+)◦ is simple and
constant on the sets Ei, i = 1, . . . , r its aggregate initial endowment is
µe(X) ∈ (Rn+)◦. Moreover µe is a fuzzy submodular.
(E4) {≻i}i≤r is the preference relation associated to the agents a ∈ Ei,
(namely for every a ∈ Ei x a y means x i y and this is interpreted
as ”the boundle x is at least as good as the boundle y for the consumer
a ∈ Ei”). The preference relation is:
(a) irreflexive and transitive;
(b) (Monotone) for every x ∈ Rn+ and every v ∈ Rn+ \ {0}, x + v ≻i x
for all i ≤ r;
(c) (continuous) for all x ∈ (Rn+)◦ the set {y ∈ Rn+ : y i x} is closed
in Rn+ for all i ≤ r.
In other words, in each coalition Ei, agents share both the same initial
endowment and the same preference criterion.
The condition (H.0) for example models an economy with r agents as a
continuum of economies where the i-th agent is the representative of infinitely
many identical agents. Moreover this model can be considered as representative
of an economy with r non-homogeneus agents, where the relative influence of
the i-th agent is given by the measure µ(Ei) for every i ≤ r.
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The following classical concepts of equilibrium theory are recalled in this setting:
• an allocation is an integrable function f : X −→ Rn+; an allocation is
feasible if µf (X) = µe(X);
• a price is any element p ∈ Rn+ \ {0};
• the budget set of an agent a of type i for the price p is the set Bp(a) =
{x ∈ Rn+ : px ≤ pei};
• a coalition is a measurable subset S of X such that µ(S) > 0.
• A coalition S can improve the allocation f if there exists an allocation
g such that
(1) g(a) ≻a f(a) µ-a.e. in S;
(2) µg(S) = µe(S).
• A coalition S strongly improves the allocation f if there exists an allo-
cation g such that
(1) g(a) ≻a f(a) µ-a.e. in S;
(2′) µg(S ∩Ei) = µe(S ∩ Ei) for all i = 1, ..., r.
• The core C(E) of an economy E is the set of all the feasible allocations
that cannot be improved by any coalition.
• The large core LC(E) of an economy E is the set of all the feasible
allocations that cannot be strongly improved by any coalition. It is
clear that f /∈ LC(E) implies f /∈ C(E), so C(E) ⊂ LC(E).
• A Walras equilibrium of E is a pair (f, p) ∈ L1C(µ,Rn+) × (Rn+ \ {0})
such that:
(i) f is a feasible allocation;
(ii) f(a) is a maximal element of ≻a in the budget set Bp(a), (namely
f(a) ∈ Bp(a) and x ≻a f(a) implies p ·x > p · e(a)) for µ-almost all
a ∈ X .
• A walrasian allocation is a feasible allocation f such that there exists a
price p so that the pair (f, p) is a Walras equilibrium.
• W (E) is the set of all the walrasian allocations of E .
The aim of this research is to obtain relations between Walras equilibria
W(E) and core of an economy C(E). In order to study relations between C(E)
and W(E), the following inclusion is proved.
Theorem 3.2. Under assumptions (E1) – (E4), there holds C(E) ⊃W (E).
Proof. Let f ∈ W (E) \ C(E). Then there exist a coalition S and a feasible
allocation g such that µ-a.e. in S g(a) ≻a f(a) and µg(S) = µe(S). On the
other side there exists a price p for which f(a) is ≻a maximal in Bp(a) µ-a.e. in
S.
Consequently, setting S1 = {a ∈ S : p · g(a) ≤ p · e(a)}, it should be µ(S1) = 0,
otherwise the elements {x = g(a) : a ∈ S1} would contradict maximality of f ,
since g(a) ≻a f(a) but p · g(a) ≤ p · f(a) for all a ∈ S1. Hence µ-a.e. in S one
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has:
p · g(a) =
n∑
i=1
pigi(a) >
n∑
i=1
piei(a) = p · e(a)
whence, by 2.14.b) and applying Lemma 2.15 with p · g and p · e in place of f
and g respectively,∫ ∗
S
p · g(a)dµ =
∫ ∗
S
n∑
i=1
pigi(a)dµ >
∫ ∗
S
n∑
i=1
piei(a)dµ =
n∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∗
S
ei(a)dµ =
= p ·
∫ ∗
S
edµ.
Thus ∫ ∗
S
p · gdµ > p ·
∫ ∗
S
edµ. (3.1)
On the other side, since g improves f , it is:∫ ∗
S
p · gdµ ≤ p ·
∫ ∗
S
g(a)dµ = p ·
∫ ∗
S
edµ
and this contradicts (3.1). 
Of course, Theorem 3.2 proves also that W (E) ⊂ LC(E).
Assumption 3.3. Suppose now that the allocation f has a representation of
the following type:
f(a) =
r∑
i=1
ai1Ei
and consider the multifunction
Γf (a) := {x ∈ Rn+ : x a f(a)} =
r∑
i=1
Ci1Ei ,
where the Ci are convex, closed and contain the sets y + (R
n
+)
◦ when y ∈ Ci.
The class of its Choquet integrable selections is
S∗Γf = {ψ ∈ L1C(µ,Rn+) with ψ(a) ∈ Γf (a) for µ− a.e. a ∈ X}.
Remark 3.4. Since Γf is simple it contains as selections all functions that are
µ-a.e. constant in Ei (the constant must be an element of Ci). So all functions
of the type
∑r
i=1 ci1Ei , ci ∈ Ci are Choquet integrable selections of Γf . For
every E in A let
MΓf (E) =
{
µψ(E), ψ ∈ S∗Γf
}
and consider its range R(MΓf ) =
⋃
E∈AMΓf (E).
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Let
If :=
{
z = µs(A)− µe(A), ∀ A ∈ A, s ∈ S∗Γf
}
. (3.2)
Now, in order to prove the convexity of I some preliminary results are needed;
the first is a density result of the multivalued integral of Γf .
Lemma 3.5. If s ∈ S∗Γf then, for every A ∈ A, there exists a ”simple” selection
g ∈ S∗Γf such that µs(A) = µg(A).
Proof. Let A ∈ A and s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S∗Γf be fixed. First of all observe
that, for every i ∈ J = {i ≤ r : µ(A ∩Ei) > 0}, the vectors
w(i) :=
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
sdµ
µ(A ∩ Ei) ∈ Ci. (3.3)
This is the mean value theorem for the Choquet integral and it is a consequence
of the Hahn-Banach theorem and ( 2.2.v), as in the countably additive case.
Suppose in fact, by contradiction, that there exists j ∈ J such that w(j) 6∈ Cj ,
then by the Hahn-Banach theorem there exist a positive functional p and a
positive number a such that
n∑
i=1
piw
(j)
i < a ≤
n∑
i=1
piyi, ∀(yi)i ∈ Cj .
Then, in particular, for all x ∈ Ej ,
n∑
i=1
piw
(j)
i =
n∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
sidµ
µ(A ∩ Ej) < a ≤
n∑
i=1
pisi(x)
and integrating on A ∩ Ej it follows that∫ ∗
A∩Ej
n∑
i=1
piw
(j)
i dµ < aµ(A ∩ Ej) ≤
∫ ∗
A∩Ej
n∑
i=1
pisi(x)dµ ≤
≤
n∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∗
A∩Ej
sidµ =
n∑
i=1
piw
(j)
i µ(A ∩Ej) < aµ(A ∩Ej)
which is clearly absurd.
Let E = ∪j∈JEj and g(x) =
∑
i∈J w
(i)1Ei+s(x)1X\E . Then g ∈ S∗Γf because
it is a ”sum” of selections. Now the following equality∫ ∗
A
sdµ =
∫ ∗
A∩E
gdµ =
∫ ∗
A
gdµ
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will be proven component by component. Let k ≤ n:∫ ∗
A
skdµ =
∫ ∗
A∩E
skdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ (∪i∈JEi : sk(x) > t})dt =
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈J
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ei : sk(x) > t})dt =
=
∑
i∈J
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ei : sk(x) > t})dt =
=
∑
i∈J
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
skdµ =
∑
i∈J
w
(k)
i µ(A ∩ Ei) =
∫ ∗
A∩E
gkdµ. (3.4)
Then the vector inequality∫ ∗
A
sdµ =
∫ ∗
A∩E
gdµ ≪
∫ ∗
A
gdµ
is proven thanks to the monotonicity of µg and (H.0). Finally, since µ(A\E) =
0, it follows easily ∫ ∗
A
gdµ =
∫ ∗
A∩E
gdµ.

Remark 3.6. Observe that, in the previous Lemma, it has been proved that, as
soon as s ∈ S∗Γf , for every fixed i ≤ r and every measurable A ⊂ Ei an element
w(i) ∈ Ci can be found, such that∫ ∗
A
sdµ = w(i)µ(A).
Proposition 3.7. Let µ : A → R0+ be a semiconvex fuzzy measure with property
(H.0). Then the range R(µ, µe) is convex.
Proof. Let Ri be the range of the (n + 1)-dimensional fuzzy measure (µ, µe),
when restricted to Ei, i = 1, ..., r and let i ≤ r. Since e is constant in Ei, it is
(µ, µe(A)) =
∫ ∗
A
(1, e)dµ = (µ(A), µ(A)e)
for every A ⊂ Ei. Since the range of µ, when restricted to Ei, is the interval
[0, µ(Ei)], then Ri is the segment joining the origin with the point (µ(Ei), µ(Ei)e).
From the property (H.0) and Proposition 2.13, it follows easily that R =∑r
i=1 Ri, hence R is convex. 
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Remark 3.8. Clearly, from Proposition 3.7 it follows also that the range of µe
(R(µe)) is convex. In particular, given A and B in A, and fixed t ∈ [0, 1], for
each i = 1, ..., r there exists a measurable set Dit ⊂ Ei such that
µe(D
i
t) = tµe(A ∩Ei) + (1− t)µe(B ∩ Ei).
Then clearly the set Dt =
⋃
iD
i
t satisfies µe(Dt) = tµe(A) + (1− t)µe(B).
Using Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.7 the following result holds
Theorem 3.9. The set If given in formula (3.2) is convex.
Proof. Thanks to Proposition 2.13 it is easy to see that If =
∑r
i=1 Ii, where
Ii := {z = µs(A)− µe(A), A ∈ A ∩ Ei, s ∈ S∗Γf }.
Then, it will suffice to prove that each Ii is convex. In particular it will be
proven that Ii = [0, µ(Ei)](Ci − ei). Since Ci is convex, so is Ci − ei and also
the cone [0, µ(Ei)](Ci − ei). So, fix any element z ∈ Ii: then there exist s ∈ S∗Γf
and a measurable A ⊂ Ei such that
z = µs(A)− µe(A) = µs(A)− eiµ(A).
Thanks to the Remark (3.6), there exists an element w ∈ Ci such that
∫
A
sdµ =
wµ(A), hence
z = (w − ei)µ(A) ∈ (Ci − ei)µ(A) ⊂ (Ci − ei)[0, µ(Ei)].
Conversely, for every w ∈ Ci, there exists a selection s such that s|Ei is con-
stantly equal to w. Moreover, for any real number x ∈ [0, µ(Ei)] there exists a
measurable set A ⊂ Ei such that µ(A) = x and µe(A) = eix. Therefore
(w − ei)x = µs(A) − µe(A) ∈ Ii.
From arbitrariness ofw and x, it follows the converse inclusion, (Ci−ei)[0, µ(Ei)] ⊂
Ii. 
Lemma 3.10. If f ∈ LC(E), there exists p ∈ Rn+, p 6= 0 such that p · x ≥ 0 for
all x ∈ If .
Proof. First If ∩ (−Rn+) = {0} will be proven. Indeed, assume by contradiction
that there exists z ∈ If ∩ (−Rn+) with z 6= 0. Then there exist a coalition A ∈ A
and a Choquet integrable selection s ∈ S1Γf such that
z = µs(A)− µe(A) ∈ (−Rn+).
Then it follows immediately that µ(A) > 0 (otherwise both µs(A) = 0 and
µe(A) = 0 whence z = 0).
Observe that z =
∑r
i=1 zi, where zi = µs(A ∩ Ei) − eiµ(A ∩ Ei). Now, let
J := {i : zi 6= 0}. Of course, J 6= ∅ otherwise z = 0, again. Clearly, z =
∑
j∈J zj .
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Now, for each j ∈ J , it is µ(A∩Ej) > 0 (otherwise zj = 0), and define sj := s1Ej .
Moreover, define A′ :=
⋃
j∈J (A ∩ Ej), and finally let us set
s0 :=
∑
j∈J
(sj − zj
µ(A ∩ Ej) )1Ej .
Since zj ∈ (−Rn+) \ {0} for each j, then the allocation s0 satisfies s0(a) ≻a
s(a) ≻a f(a) µ-a.e. in A′, and moreover∫ ∗
A′∩Ej
s0dµ =
∫ ∗
A′∩Ej
sjdµ− zj = ejµ(A ∩ Ej)
holds true, for all j ∈ J . Moreover, if i /∈ J , by definition it is A′ ∩ Ei = ∅, and
so ∫ ∗
A′∩Ei
s0dµ = 0 =
∫ ∗
A′∩Ei
edµ.
So it is proved that the coalition A′ strongly improves f by the allocation s0.
But this is impossible, since f ∈ LC(E).
In conclusion If ∩ (−Rn+) = {0} and hence If ∩ (−Rn+)o = ∅. Since both sets
are convex, and the second one has non-empty interior, we can apply the Strong
Separation Theorem, and determine some p ∈ Rn p 6= 0 such that p · x ≥ 0 for
all x ∈ If .
It only remains to prove that p ∈ Rn+. Indeed, we have that (Rn+)o ⊂ If ; in
fact if x ∈ (Rn+)o, then the allocation ψ =
x
µ(X)
+ f is in S∗Γf and∫ ∗
X
ψdµ−
∫ ∗
X
edµ =
∫ ∗
X
fdµ+ x−
∫ ∗
X
edµ = x
since f is feasible. Then p · x ≥ 0 for every x ∈ (Rn+)o, whence necessarily
p ∈ Rn+. 
Under assumption (3.3) it follows that
Proposition 3.11. Let p be as in Lemma 3.10 and γ be the map defined by:
γ(a) = inf{p · y : y ∈ (Γf (a)− e(a)) ∪ {0} }. Then γ is identically null.
Proof. Observe that, since Γf and e are simple, (Γf−e)∪{0} is graph-measurable,
that is
{(a, x) ∈ X × Rn+ : x ∈ (Γf (a)− e(a)) ∪ {0}} ∈ A ⊗ BRn .
Since f is a simple function then, for every a ∈ Ei, γ(a) = 0∧ [infy∈Ci p · y − p ·
ei] := γi.
Let I0 be the set I0 = {i ≤ r : γi < 0}. It will be proven that I0 is empty.
Suppose by contradiction that there exists i ∈ I0, namely γi = infy∈Ci p · y− p ·
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ei < 0. Since Ci is closed there exists xi ∈ Ci such that γi = p · xi − p · ei. Let s
be the function defined by: s = xi1Ei + f1X\Ei . Observe that∫
Ei
sdµ−
∫
Ei
edµ = (xi − ei)µ(Ei) ∈ If .
So, by Lemma 3.10, p·(xi−ei)µ(Ei) = µ(Ei)p·(xi−ei) ≥ 0, while, by hypothesis,
µ(Ei) > 0 and p(xi − ei) = γi < 0: contradiction. 
Theorem 3.12. Under Assumptions (E1) – (E4) and 3.3) if f ∈ LC(E) is a
simple allocation, then f ∈W (E).
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 3.2 it is W (E) ⊂ C(E). To prove the converse inclu-
sion fix f ∈ LC(E). Consider (Γf − e) ∪ {0} and let If be its Aumann integral
obtained via Choquet integrable selections. By Lemma 3.10, it is known that
If ∩ (−Rn+) = {0} and p ∈ Rn+ exists such that
px ≥ 0 for every x ∈ If . (3.5)
By Proposition 3.11 a.e. in X, p · e(x) ≤ p · y, for every y x f(x). So, by
continuity of the preorder, a.e. in X, p · e(x) ≤ p · f(x). It will be proven now
that the previous inequality is in fact an equality. Let bk = p · e(x), for every
x ∈ Ek; by Corollary 2.14∫ ∗
X
p · e(x)dµ = p ·
∫ ∗
X
e(x)dµ =
r∑
k=1
bkµ(Ek).
Let A ∈ A be fixed. Then
0 ≤
∫ ∗
A
p(f − e)dµ =
r∑
k=1
∫ ∗
A∩Ek
p(f − e)dµ =
r∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ek : pf(x) > bk + t})dt =
=
r∑
k=1
∫ ∞
bk
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ek : pf(x) > u})du =
=
r∑
k=1
(∫ ∞
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ek : pf(x) > u})du−
∫ bk
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ek : pf(x) > u})du
)
≤
≤
r∑
k=1
(∫ ∗
A∩Ek
pfdµ−
∫ bk
0
µ({x ∈ A ∩ Ek : pe(x) > u})du
)
= (3.6)
=
r∑
k=1
(∫ ∗
A∩Ek
p · fdµ−
∫ ∗
A∩Ek
p · edµ
)
=
∫ ∗
A
p · fdµ−
∫ ∗
A
p · edµ =
= p
(∫ ∗
A
fdµ−
∫ ∗
A
edµ
)
.
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For A = X , since f is feasible and p · f − p · e ≥ 0 µ-a.e., it follows
0 ≤
∫ ∗
X
p(f − e)dµ = p
(∫ ∗
X
fdµ−
∫ ∗
X
edµ
)
= 0;
this in turn implies that µpf = µpe onA. Applying Corollary 2.7 we get p·f = p·e
µ-a.e. in X .
The remaining part of the proof is exactly the same as that of [27, Theorem
2.1.1, pag 133 ff] since preferences are assumed to be monotone and continuous.

3.1. Existence of Equilibria. Assume now that the preferences have the fol-
lowing structure:
• there exist r subsets J1, . . . , Jr ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that:
i) for every x, y ∈ C, x ≻a y ⇐⇒ xj > yj , j ∈ Jk when a ∈ Ek;
ii)
⋂r
i=1 Ji 6= ∅.
This means that within each coalition Ek only the items of the k-th list Jk are
considered, in order to decide whether a bundle is preferred to another. Observe
that such assumption does not fulfil monotonicity, in the sense of (A.3.b), but
it satisfies the more demanding form
• for every x ∈ Rn+, z ∈ (Rn+)0, then x+ z ≻a x for every a ∈ X .
However Lemma 3.10 remains true: one has only to note that If ∩ (−Rn+)0 = ∅
with the same proof.
Proposition 3.13. Under Assumptions (E1) – (E4), e ∈W (E).
Proof. It is enough to prove that e ∈ C(E) and then apply Theorem 3.12. As-
sume by contradiction that e 6∈ C(E); then there exists a pair (f, S) that improves
e, namely
3.13.a) f ≻a e, when a ∈ S;
3.13.b)
∫ ∗
S
fdµ =
∫ ∗
S
edµ.
From 3.13.a), if k ∈ ⋂ri=1 Ji, we have for the k-th entries of f and e, fk(a) >
ek(a), a ∈ S. Hence by Corollary 2.7, there holds∫ ∗
S
fkdµ >
∫ ∗
S
ekdµ
that contradicts 3.13.b). 
It will be shown now that, in some cases, allocations that are constant in the
sets Ei turn out to be important when searching elements of the core C(E).
A technical result will be established first, concerning the Choquet integral
in this context.
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Lemma 3.14. Let µ be submodular, f be any scalar integrable function on X
and c any positive real constant. If there exists a set S ∈ A, with positive
measure, such that
∫ ∗
S
cdµ ≥
∫ ∗
S
fdµ, then either f ≡ c µ-a.e. in S or there
exists a measurable subset S′ ⊂ S, with µ(S′) > 0, such that f(s) < c for all
s ∈ S′.
Proof. Assume directly that f and c are not µ-a.e. equal in S, and define:
H := {s ∈ S : f(s) 6= c}, H1 := {s ∈ H : f(s) < c}, H2 := {s ∈ H : f(s) > c}.
Then µ(H) > 0. By contradiction, suppose that µ(H1) = 0, then f ≥ c µ-a.e. in
S. By (2.2.iii) it follows that
∫ ∗
S
fdµ ≥
∫ ∗
S
cdµ and so the two integrals coincide.
Now, consider the non-negative map f − c in S \H1: thanks to (2.2.iv) it is
0 =
∫ ∗
S
fdµ− cµ(S) =
∫ ∗
S\H1
fdµ−
∫ ∗
S\H1
cdµ =
∫ ∗
S\H1
(f − c)dµ
But also
0 =
∫ ∗
S\H1
(f − c)dµ ≤
∫ ∗
H2
(f − c)dµ+
∫ ∗
S\H
(f − c)dµ =
∫ ∗
H2
(f − c)dµ ≤
≤
∫ ∗
S\H1
(f − c)dµ.
So,
∫ ∗
H2
(f − c)dµ = 0 and µ(H2) is positive, otherwise µ(H) = 0. Then, from
Lemma 2.15, it would follow
∫ ∗
H2
(f − c)dµ > 0: contradiction. 
Now, assume that the preference preorders ≻i are of a special type, i.e. sup-
pose that they are represented by r utility functions ui, such that
u1) each ui : R
n
+ → R is positive, increasing, continuous, and concave;
u2) each ui is positively homogeneous in the one-dimensional subspace gen-
erated by the vector ei := e1Ei.
Observe that a Jensen-type theorem holds true also in this case, e.g.∫ ∗
X
u(f1, ..., fk)dµ ≤ u(
∫ ∗
X
f1dµ, ...,
∫ ∗
X
fkdµ)
as soon as the integrals exist, u is concave, increasing, continuous, and µ(X) = 1.
Remark 3.15. Observe that in the paper [50] the dual inequality is stated, for
a convex function u, but under the condition of comonotonicity of the mappings
f1, . . . , fn.
Following [50], the following notion of concave function in the positive orthant
of Rn is adopted:
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Definition 3.16. An increasing map u : Rn+ → R+0 is concave if, for every n-
tuple (t1, ..., tn) ∈ Rn+ there exist n non-negative parameters a1, ..., an and a real
constant c, such that
(3.16.1) a1t1 + ...+ antn + c = u(t1, ..., tn) and
(3.16.2) a1τ1 + ...+ anτn + c ≥ u(τ1, ..., τn) for all (τ1, ..., τn) ∈ Rn+.
Now the following result will be proven:
Theorem 3.17. If u is an increasing and concave function according to the
previous definition, and f1, ..., fn are scalarly integrable allocations such that
u(f1, ..., fn) is integrable too, then, provided that µ(X) = 1:∫ ∗
X
u(f1, ..., fk)dµ ≤ u(
∫ ∗
X
f1dµ, ...,
∫ ∗
X
fkdµ).
Proof. Set ti :=
∫ ∗
X
fidµ for all i, and let ai, c be the constants given in the
previous definition. So, thanks to the properties of the asymmetric integral it is:
u(
∫ ∗
X
f1dµ, ...,
∫ ∗
X
fkdµ) = u(t1, ..., tn) = a1t1 + ...+ antn + c =
= a1
∫ ∗
X
f1dµ+ ...+ an
∫ ∗
X
fndµ+
∫ ∗
X
cdµ ≥
≥
∫ ∗
X
(a1f1 + ...+ anfn)dµ+
∫ ∗
X
cdµ =
=
∫ ∗
X
(a1f1 + ...+ anfn + c)dµ ≥
∫ ∗
X
u(f1, ..., fn)dµ,
the last inequality following from (3.16.2). 
Before stating the next results, some notations will be introduced. Given any
integrable allocation f , let f be the following map:
f =
r∑
i=1
∫ ∗
Ei
fdµ
µ(Ei)
1Ei.
Clearly, f is constant in each set Ei, and we call it the average function of
f . Of course, f is feasible if and only if f is. The next result states that,
when preferences are of the type described above, given a feasible allocation f ∈
LC(E), then also its average function f belongs to LC(E). This fact, thanks to
Theorems 3.2 and 3.12, allows to deduce that f ∈ C(E) implies f ∈ C(E)∩W (E).
Theorem 3.18. In the situation described above, assume that f is any feasible
allocation belonging to C(E). Then f ∈ C(E).
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Proof. As already observed, it will suffice to show that f ∈ LC(E). Assume
by contradiction that there exist a coalition A with positive measure and an
allocation g such that g(a) ≻a f(a) for all a ∈ A and moreover
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
gdµ =∫ ∗
A∩Ei
edµ for all i = 1, ..., r. Now, fix any index i such that µ(A ∩ Ei) > 0, and
denote by wi the constant value of f in Ei: we have ui(g(a)) > ui(w
i) for every
a ∈ A ∩Ei and
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
ui(g)dµ > ui(wi)µ(A ∩ Ei) and
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
gdµ = eiµ(A ∩ Ei).
Now, thanks to the properties u1) and u2), it is
ui(e
i) = ui
(
1
µ(A ∩ Ei)
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
eidµ
)
= ui
(
1
µ(A ∩ Ei)
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
gdµ
)
≥
≥ 1
µ(A ∩Ei)
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
u(g)dµ >
1
µ(A ∩ Ei)ui(wi)µ(A ∩ Ei) = ui(w
i).
This clearly means that e improves f in Ei. The initial endowment e improves
also f in some coalition S ⊂ Ei: indeed this is obvious if ui(f) = ui(wi) in Ei;
otherwise, by concavity,
ui(w
i) = ui


∫ ∗
Ei
fdµ
µ(Ei)

 ≥ 1µ(Ei)
∫ ∗
Ei
ui(f)dµ,
i.e.
∫ ∗
Ei
ui(f)dµ ≤
∫ ∗
Ei
ui(w
i)dµ. Now, by Lemma 3.14 there exists a measurable
subset S ⊂ Ei, such that ui(f(s)) < ui(wi) < ui(ei) in S: this means that e
improves f in S, and therefore f /∈ C(E); contradiction. 
Also in this setting it is possible to prove that e ∈ C(E).
Theorem 3.19. In the situation described above, the initial endowment e is in
C(E).
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Proof. Assume that a coalition A and an allocation g exist, strongly improving
e. Fix any index i such that µ(Ei ∩A) > 0. Then, for all a ∈ A ∩ Ei we get
ui(g(a)) > ui(e
i) = ui


∫ ∗
A∩Ei
eidµ
µ(Ei ∩ A)

 = ui


∫ ∗
A∩Ei
gdµ
µ(Ei ∩ A)

 ≥
≥ 1
µ(Ei ∩A)
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
ui(g)dµ.
Thanks to Lemma 2.15, integrating we have then∫ ∗
A∩Ei
ui(g)dµ >
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
ui(g)dµ
which is clearly absurd. So, e ∈ LC(E), but this also implies that e ∈ W (E) and
e ∈ C(E). 
In the last situation, it is possible to describe what are precisely the simple
elements in the core C(E).
Proposition 3.20. In the setting outlined above, for any feasible simple map-
ping f : X → Rn+, i.e. f =
∑r
i=1 w
i1Ei , where w
i is constant for each i, the
following are equivalent:
(3.20.1) ui(w
i) ≥ ui(ei) for all i = 1, ..., r and uj(wj) = uj(ej) for at least one
index j.
(3.20.2) f ∈ C(E).
Proof. First, assume that f ∈ C(E). If there exists an index j for which
uj(w
j) < uj(e
j), then clearly e improves f in Ej , which is impossible. There-
fore, ui(w
i) ≥ ui(ei) for all i. However, if ui(wi) > ui(ei) for all i, then f would
improve e in the whole space, since f is feasible, and this is in contrast with
Theorem 3.19. So, there exists at least an index j such that uj(w
j) = uj(e
j).
Now, assume that ui(w
i) ≥ ui(ei) for all i, and prove that f ∈ LC(E): since
f is simple, this will imply that f ∈ C(E). By contradiction, if an integrable
allocation g strongly improves f in a coalition S, then there exists an index i
such that µ(S ∩ Ei) > 0, and ui(g(s)) > ui(wi) ≥ ui(ei) for all s ∈ S ∩ Ei.
Moreover,
∫ ∗
S∩Ei
gdµ =
∫ ∗
S∩Ei
edµ: so, g improves e in S ∩Ei, which is impos-
sible thanks to Proposition 3.19.

In the sequel, the following restrictions to the utility functions ui are imposed:
they are all the same concave function u, and u is (positively) linear in the
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subspace generated by the vectors ei := e1Ei, i = 1, ..., r. In this situation it is
clear that, for all measurable sets A, it is:∫ ∗
A
u(e)dµ =
∑
i
∫ ∗
A∩Ei
u(e)dµ =
∑
i
u(ei)µ(A ∩ Ei) =
= u(
∑
i
eiµ(A ∩Ei)) = u(
∫ ∗
A
edµ).
Finally, it will be proven that, in the last restrictive hypotheses on the prefer-
ences, every allocation in the core is necessarily simple, and therefore C(E) =
W (E).
Theorem 3.21. Under the previous conditions on the preferences, for every
integrable allocation f the following are equivalent:
(3.21.1) f ∈W (E);
(3.21.2) f ∈ C(E);
(3.21.3) f = f and u(f) = u(e) µ-a.e.
Proof. It will be proven that (3.21.1)⇒ (3.21.2)⇒(3.21.3)⇒ (3.21.1). Thanks to
Theorem 3.2, it’s clear that (3.21.1)⇒ (3.21.2). Implication (3.21.2) ⇒ (3.21.3)
will be proven now.
Fix any allocation f ∈ C(E). Then, thanks to Theorem 3.18, it is f ∈ C(E).
The equality u(wi) = u(ei) for all i, where as usual wi denotes the constant
value of the average function f in Ei, will be proven first. Since f is feasible and
u is concave, it is∫ ∗
X
u(f)dµ
µ(X)
≤ u


∫ ∗
X
fdµ
µ(X)

 = u


∫ ∗
X
edµ
µ(X)

 =
∫ ∗
X
u(e)dµ
µ(X)
.
So, ∑
i
u(wi)µ(Ei) ≤
∑
i
u(ei)µ(Ei).
But it is known that u(wi) ≥ u(ei) for all i, thanks to Proposition 3.20, hence the
last inequality would be violated if u(wi) > u(ei) for some index i: summarizing,
it is u(ei) = u(wi) for all i = 1, ..., r.
Now f = f µ-a.e. will be proven: otherwise, there exist an index i and a
measurable set A ⊂ Ei, such that µ(A) > 0 and f1A(a) 6= wi for all a ∈ A. For
all a ∈ Ei it is
u(f(a)) = u


∫ ∗
Ei
fdµ
µ(Ei)

 ≥ 1µ(Ei)
∫ ∗
Ei
u(f)dµ,
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since u is concave. Thus∫ ∗
Ei
u(f)dµ ≤ µ(Ei), u(f) =
∫ ∗
Ei
u(wi)dµ.
Thanks to Lemma 3.14 there exists a measurable set S ⊂ Ei with µ(S) > 0 and
u(f(a)) < u(wi) for all a ∈ S. But u(wi) = u(ei), for all i, hence
u(f(a)) < u(ei)
holds true, for all a ∈ S, which shows that the coalition S and the allocation e
improve f : contradiction, since f ∈ C(E). Then it is possible to conclude that
f = f µ-a.e. and the second implication is proved. Finally, if (3.21.3) holds
true, f = f ∈ C(E) thanks to Proposition 3.20, and also f ∈ W (E) thanks to
Theorem 3.12. Thus, also the last implication is demonstrated. 
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